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Abstract  
In this investigation we identify the effects of compression and frame rate reduction on the performance of four video analytics (VA) systems utilizing a low complexity scenario, such as the Ssterile Zzone (SZ). Additionally, we identify the most influential scene parameters, affecting the performance of these systems. The Sterile ZoneSZ (SZ) scenario is a scene consisting of a fence, not to be trespassed, and an area with grass. The VA system needs to alarm when there is an intruder (attack) entering the scene. The work includes testing of the systems with uncompressed and compressed (with H.264/MPEG-4 AVC at 25 and 5 frames per second) footage, consisting of quantified scene parameters. The scene parameters include descriptions on of scene contrast, camera to subject distance, and attack portrayal. Additional footage, including only distractions (no attacks) is also investigated. Results have shown that every system has performed differently for each compression/frame rate level, whilst overall, compression has not adversely affected the performance of the systems. Frame rate reduction has decreased performance and scene parameters influence the behavior of the systems differently. Most false alarms were triggered with a distraction clip, consisting ofincluding abrupt shadows through the fence. Findings could contribute to the improvement of VA systems.  
Keywords: Video Analytics, H.264/MPEG-4 AVC, Intruder Detection, Scene Characterization, Imagery Acceptance 

1.	INTRODUCTION 
Video analytics (VA) are computerized autonomous systems that analyze events from camera views for applications, such as traffic monitoring and behavior recognition  ADDIN EN.CITE [1, 2]. VA systems are objective tools that the police utilizes to complete identification tasks from Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) footage. CCTV footage is used by the police for the completion of three main tasks: i) the identification of a person (i.e. from facial information, clothing, gait), ii) an action (e.g. who gave the first punch), and iii) an object (i.e. number plate, vehicle type) [3-5]. In consideration of the vast amount of video CCTV data [6, 7], the monotonous task of human visual examination of video data, and the effective impact that CCTV has on conviction of crimes [8], automated systems  are a beneficial tool to the police. 

The Image Library for Intelligent Detection Systems (i-LIDS) provides various scenarios of video surveillance datasets. This is a UK government initiative for the development and selection of VA systems. Each scenario is made up of three datasets:; two publically available (training and test datasets) and one privately held evaluation dataset. The private one is used in order to benchmark the performance of VA systems and provide the developers with a UK Government classification standard [9]. Part of the publically available Sterile Zone (SZ) dataset One of theof i-LIDS scenarios is investigated in this paper.: part of the publically available Sterile Zone (SZ) dataset. The SZ is a low complexity scenario, consisting of a fence (not to be trespassed) and an area with grass (see Figure 1). The VA system needs to alarm when there is an intruder entering the scene (an attack). The four VA systems under investigation have obtained UK Government approval by been tested with “uncompressed” footage.  The i-LIDS datasets can be obtained from the Home Office Centre for Applied Sscience and Ttechnology, to assist those wishing to investigate solutions in relation to the VA systems[10].  

The aim of this investigation is to identify the effects of compression and reduction of frame rate to the performance of four VA systems (labeled in this paper A, B, C, D) with the SZ scenario. Furthermore, to identify the most influential scene parameters, affecting the performance of each VA system under investigation. 

The work includes testing of the systems with D1 PAL resolution of uncompressed and compressed (6 levels of compression with H.264/MPEG-4 AVC at 25 and 5 frames per second) footage, consisting of quantified scene parameters. The scene parameters were extracted from the characterization of the content of 110 attacks (scenes). The characterization included both objective and subjective techniques relating to scene contrast (contrast between main subject and background), camera to subject distance, subject description (e.g. one person, two people), subject approach (e.g. run, walk), and subject orientation (e.g. perpendicular, diagonal). After the characterization, the scenes were grouped based on common parameters. Additional footage, including only distractions (i.e. no attacks to be detected) is also investigated. Distractions are elements in the scene, such as abrupt illumination changes and birds that could be falsely recognized by the systems as, intruders. 

The results have shown the proportion of correct attack detection for systems A and D at 5fps increases significantly with increasing kbps (less compression). For the rest of the compression levels and systems, compression has not affected the overall performance of the systems. An analysis based on the scene content parameters enables understanding on where systems need improvement. Systems have performed differently for each parameter. Most systems have a problem with scene attacks when the subject is running or is close to the camera. Perhaps, the developers of such systems do not expect the attacker to be close to the camera and their systems have not been tuned for such occasions. System developers, seeing the analysis included in this work, would be able to understand where their system needs improving. Most false alarms were triggered with a distraction clip consisting of abrupt shadows through the fence. 

This work, is a continuation of a previous investigation on the subject published in 2012[11]. The current investigation provides more results as moreadditional footage (attacks) has been investigated. The previous work concentrated on the creation of appropriate degraded distorted datasets (compressed and with reduced frame rate), whereas in this current work the concentration is on the testing of VA systems with the degraded distorted datasets. Section 2 contains some background information on analytics systems, video compression, and image content characterization. Section 3 presents the experimental methodology. Data analysis of the results is described in Sections 4. Section 5 discusses the results. Lastly, in Section 6 conclusions are drawn, along with suggestions for future work.
2.	Theory
VA systems can operate in real time (i.e. incidence alter) and in post event analysis (i.e. when are incorporated within a recorder for event based retrieval)[12]. Little research has been done in the area of image compression and analytics systems, as because currently only few scenarios are capable for autonomous analysis (SZ is one of them)[1]. Nonetheless, this area is receiving a large amount of research investment, even though it is currently still in its infancy  ADDIN EN.CITE [1, 2]. In a world of rapidly technological changes, analytics systems will need to be more flexible and be able to besuitable for used in post-event forensics and with limited transmission bandwidth (e.g. through an Internet Protocol network). Additionally, understanding on how the analytics systems perform with compression, frame rate reduction and defined attack parameters could contribute to the further improvement in the development of such systems.  For example, in this investigation VA systems are tested using controlled footage in terms of conveyed information, which allows a better understanding on how the systems perform. 

In one investigation [13] with the SZ scenario and H.264/MPEG-4 AVC compressor, the results have shown the performance of the analytics system to be affected at 220kbps or less???, either by not detecting an attack, or producing a slower alarm response time. The work investigated 11 attacks with one VA system. Thus, in this current investigation far more footage and number of government approved VA systems have been included. 

In Europe the standard video frame rate for television is 25 frames per second (fps) (or 50i interlaced fields). Commonly, security systems record/transmit video data at lower frame rates in order to satisfy storage and transmission requirements.  R However, reducing the standard frame rate increases the possibility of missing important information from the initial video sequence. Low frame rate is considered equivalent to ‘abrupt motion’, or discontinuity by tracking algorithms [14]. Tracking algorithms, which are commonly used by analytics systems, frequently use motion continuity and their performance is affected by low frame rate  ADDIN EN.CITE [15, 16]. 

Compression techniques are developed around the sensitivity of the human eye in order to make compression artefacts less, or not visible to humans. Nevertheless, these “non visible” artefacts might affect the performance of mathematical algorithms applied by VA systems.  A previous subjective investigation (i.e. with police staff) on the identification of faces from compressed CCTV footage has shown the results to be highly dependent on scene content. For example, compression affected more dark and bright lightness scenes, as they obtained lower subjective scores than medium lightness scenes. Furthermore, Tthe lightness parameter in the subjective investigation has affected the observer’s responses. Thus, someone can conclude that image parameters affect the usefulness of the imagery to complete a task for subjective investigations. 

Image usefulness is a visio-cognitive attribute of image quality that relates to “the degree of apparent suitability of the reproduced image to satisfy the correspondent task” [17, 18]. The same definition of image quality is been used also for automated systems [4]. The image usefulness definition could be used for automated systems, in terms of the completion of tasks, but the image parameters that affect performance of humans and automated systems might be different. At the moment there is not much research relating to the subject ofeffects that image quality for has in automated systems. Also, the term image quality has been defined by imaging scientists to be strictly subjective[19, 20]. Perhaps, a new definition could be developed for automated systems that will relate to the parameter acceptance of the system/algorithm to complete the identification task. Why don't’s you propose one here for the purpose of this work?Algorithms can be tuned and trained on scene content parameters (e.g. to work with low illumination scenes). 
3.	Methodology
The methodology includes three main steps: a) preparation of the test footage (uncompressed and degradeddistorted), b) scene content characterization to define image parameters, and c) testing of the VA systems.  

3.1 Preparation of the test footage 

The SZ dataset is segmented into shorter video clips. Table I, provides a general description of the seventeen clips under investigation. These clips include 110 attacks and have 11 hours duration of footage. This part of the dataset was selected based on the availability of the original tape recordings of the scenario. The uncompressed footage was originally recorded using analogue DigiBeta videocassettes at D1 PAL resolution (720 x 576), 50ifps (interlaced frames per second) and a bit rate of 12 megabytes per second (MB/sec.). DigiBeta uses a lossless compression at 10-bit, compressing YUV channels at ratios 4:2:2. The iLIDS team provides the publically available datasets with 10% compression and only the tapes could have been used to obtain the “uncompressed” reference.   

Table I. Part of the SZ scenario dataset under test. The table provides information in relation to the general description of each clip. The first seven clips contain attacks and the last 10 clips contain only distractions.  Most of the information has been obtained from the dataset ground truth data.  
Clip name 	No.  of Attacks 	Duration in munites 	Time of Day	Further inf. on  Day	Further distractions
1) sztea101a	10	00:37 	Dawn 	None	Camera switch from monochrome to colour
2) sztea101b	15	00:49 	Dusk 	None	Camera switch from monochrome to colour, bBats





8) szten101a	none	00:15	Day 	Overcast  	Bag, squirrel, small illumination variations 
9) szten101b	none	00:30	Day 	None	Rabbits, shadow through fence, illumination variations 
10) szten101c	none	00:30	Dusk	None	Camera switch from colour to monochrome, birds, rabbits
11) szten101d	none	00:30	Dawn	None 	Birds, rabbits, illumination variations 
12) szten102a	none	00:45	Day	Some	Birds, illumination variations, shadow through fence
13) szten102b	none	00:30	Day 	Overcast, Rain	Birds, small illumination variations
14) szten102c	none	00:30	Day 	Overcast, Snow	None 
15) szten102d	none	00:15	Dusk 	Overcast 	Camera switch from colour to monochrome, foxes, rabbits 
16) szten103a	none	00:40	Night 	None	Small changes of camera positioning because of wind
17) szten103b	none	00:30	Day	Overcast	Small changes of camera positioning because of wind

The original videocassettes were digitized using the Apple™ Final Cut Pro™ (FCP) uncompressed format. The FCP uncompressed format uses similar specifications to DigiBeta: 8bit YUV 4:2:2 and 20MB/sec bit rate.   Furthermore, all clips were de-interlaced in FCP, by removing one of the fields in order to avoid any problems with the interlaced effect through the transmitting of the video clips to the VA systems. This should not affect the results, as the VA systems would  graspgrab the fields to further analyze (based on how analogue signal behaves) rather than the progressive frames. Thus the reference original in this investigation is in FCP uncompressed format at 20MB/sec and at 25 fps.

The MPEG Streamclip implementation encoder was employed to compress the clips at selected target bitrates and frame rates, using the video coding standard H.264/MPEG-4 AVC. H.264/MPEG-4 AVC, which  compressor was chosen because it is widely employed in surveillance applications  ADDIN EN.CITE [5, 11, 21]. The MPEG Streamclip encoder was selected with only bitrate control (i.e. no GOP size, or B frames were selected), because it complies with the common functioning of security recording systems[5, 11]. The compression bitrates used were approximately the following in kilobits per second (kbps) for each type of the chosen frame rate: 
- 25fps: 200, 400, 800, 1200, 1800, 2000;
- 5fps: 40, 80, 160, 240, 320, 400. 

The produced degraded footage at 5fps repeats 5 times each of the extracted 5 frames from each second. For example, the duration of the video clips at 5fps is the same as its corresponding video clip at 25fps. The range of the bit rates at 5fps were chosen to be equivalent to the bit rates at 25fps taking into consideration the reduction of frame rate. 

The test footage, for the VA systems, consists of the reference and its twelve degraded versions. The range of the degraded versions was chosen in order to cover a variety of compressed qualities. Finding in automated face recognition have shown that compression, even at ratios as low as 10:1, does not adversely affect the performance of the systems and it has been shown that some compression ratios even increase the performance of face recognition systems  ADDIN EN.CITE [22-25]. The behavior of the VA systems might be similar to automated face recognition systems. It was considered important to include a variety of degraded footage (high and low). 

3.2 Scene content characterization 

The characterization of the scene content of each attack will should enable a better understanding on the parameters that might affect the performance, in terms of correct detection, of analytics systems. The influential parameters could be related to image quality properties attributes (e.g. contrast, sharpness), or/and the properties of the subject to be detected (e.g. orientation).  Each of the 110 attacks was classified into content parameters. 

Table II, includes the name and total number of each parameter in each group. The parameters that describe the properties of the subject (groups: approach, description, distance, and orientation) in the attacks were extracted by visual examination (apart of the distance group) and were already available within the ground truth data of the SZ dataset. The approach group parameters describe the way the subject approaches the fence and consists of 9 levels. The description group parameters consist of 2 levels and explains if the subject includes one person or two people next to each other (i.e. this indicates a bigger subject area to be detected). The distance group parameters consist of 3 levels and describes the distance of the subject to the camera; far - 30 meters away from the camera, middle - 15 meters away from the camera, and close - 10 meters away from the camera. Figure 1 provides an example of the distance group parameters. Orientation group parameters consist of two levels and indicates if the attack happened perpendicular or diagonal to the fence. If the attack happens diagonal then the subject is in the scene for a longer time than with a perpendicular attack. 


Figure 1. The Sterile Zone scenario from the iLIDS dataset. From left to right, the camera to subject distance is far, medium and close.

The parameters that describe the image quality of the attack is contrast and their values were obtained using an objective measure. The Michelson formula (see Eq. 1) [26] was used to derive the contrast values  (ranges from 0 to +1). 
  
           (Eq. 1)





Table II. Summary Grouping of attack scene parameters.  Each column provides the group parameter name identification (i.e. contrast) and its parameters description (i.e. very low).  
Contrast	Approach To fence	Descriptionnumber of people	Distance	Orientation
1. Very low (0.0-0.2): 92. Low (0.2-0.3): 253. Low medium (0.3-0.4): 364. Medium (0.4-0.6): 245. High medium (0.6-0.7): 16	1. Walk: 28scenes2. Run: 203. Creep walk: 154. Crawl: 115. Crouch Run: 116. Crouch Walk: 97. Body Drag: 78. Log Roll: 39. Walk with ladder: 6	1. One person: 982. Two people: 12	1. Far: 362. Middle: 373. Close: 37	1. Perpendicular: 122. Diagonal: 98

3.3 Testing of the VA systems

The four VA systems under investigation are isolated units (not incorporated within a recorder) and are designed to take composite signal as an input. The names and/or specifications of the algorithms would not be revealed in order to respect manufacturer’s rights. The VA systems are going to be treated here as black boxes and the manufacturers have optimized their algorithms for the testing with the iLIDS SZ scenario. TThis is what happens operationally when the manufacturers submit their systems for UK government testing. As it has been mentioned above, the four systems have received UK Government approval and could be further classified as operationally successful systems. The systems have been labeled as A, B, C, and D. 

To be able toFor measuringe the performance of the analytics systems, a method was required to simultaneously play the video clips and record the alarm attacks raised. Important criteria were to keep the video quality as high as possible and the ability to accurately determine the time-code from the video file, so that alarm times could be recorded precisely. Because of it’s ability to play a large variety of video formats, Thethe VLC application from VideoLan [27] was chosen to act as the player running on an Intel i7 PC with Windows 7. 

An ATI Radeon X1300 graphics card with PAL composite output was used to feed the analytics systems via a Kramer 105VB distribution amplifier (see figure 2). A broadcast standard graphics card was considered, but the effort to integrate this with the system was beyond the scope of the project. The analytics systems signal the detection of an alarm attack by shorting out a normally open contact on one, or more of their output connectors. To interface these to the PC, an Amplicon PCI236 Digital I/O card was used via an EX230 Isolation Panel. A bespoke software application written in C# was used to integrate VLC with the Amplicon card. The Net API called nVLC [28] was used to interface to the VLC libraries directly and derive a precise time-code from the playing video. 

The created developed software allows for multiple video clips to be queued for play-out, with each clip being able to play multiple times. With a video clip playing, alarm attacks were captured via the Amplicon card. Each alarm was saved along with the corresponding clip time, clip name, device name and repeat number to a simple text file. The ground truth data for each clip was then compared with this file. and the results exported as an Excel spreadsheet. 

The rules determining whether an alarmed attack was true, or false were defined as follows: if an alarm falls within the ground truth alarm period, then a true match is recorded; if there are further alarms within the same period they are ignored; if an alarm occurs outside of the ground truth period, then that is noted as a false alarm. The obtained results have scores of 1 to the correctly detected attacks and 0 to the un-detected attacks.  To estimate the consistency of experimental recording the results, each clip was repeated 10 times. Black video of thirty second was played between each clip to. This was applied in order to force the algorithms to reset algorithm settings before each clip. Most of the manufacturers of the systems have confirmed that it takes about 10 seconds for their algorithms to be trained for a specific scene. 


Figure 2.  Video distribution and recording of results.

There are were some small variations on the results between the repeated times,  which is due to the noise added to the video signal (i.e. as part of the output of footage to the detection systems), and/or the actual intrinsic parameters of the analytics systems (i.e. how it is tuned) and/or the properties of the events (i.e. it was observed that variation was triggered by certain events). This phenomenon was investigated further by repeating five times the 10 times repeats on 3 clips with attacks. The derived proportion values (i.e. average of 10 times repeat) among the five times trial were consistent and similar. Also, the proportion values of each of the five 10 times repeats fell within the range of the calculated 95% of the exact confidence interval for proportion data method [29]. For example, if in a 10- times repeat of an attack only 3 get successfully detected (0.3 proportion) than in another 10 times repeats of the same attack the proportion, according to 95% of the exact confidence interval method, will range between 0.0667 and 0.6525. 
4.	Results
The analysis of the results has been divided into three parts. The first part identifies the global detection performance for each individual system with respect to compression (section 4.1); the second part identifies the most influential attack parameters for each individual system with respect to compression (section 4.2); and the third part provides an analysis on false alarms (section 4.3).  

4.1. Global detection performance analysis with respect to compression  

The global performance analyzes the relationship between detection performances of all the attacks with respect to compression (at 25fps and 5fps). As it has been mentioned in section 3.3, all the VA systems under investigation have produced some variation in the results from the repeated 10 times of each clip/attack. Thus, the results are not strictly binary but rather proportional with a binary nature. The results represent two categories, which are success (correct detection – score of 1) and failure (no detection – score of 0). In order to take into consideration the number of successes in an n repeated number of trials (i.e. in this case 10) for each attack, the obtained recorded results were modeled using logistic regression (family binomial or quasibinomial, depending on overdispersion) with the generalized linear model (gml) function in R software for statistcs [ ].  In this way a weighted regression is carried out, using the number of trials as weights and the logit link function to ensure linearity [30, 31].  All the analysis of results, in this section and section 4.2 were curried out in R. Equation 2 provides the logistic model for proportional data and its linear predictor is presented by equation 3 (where p/q, p stands for the number of successes and q for the number of failures DESCRIBE ALL PARAMETERS in both equations). 

,   (Eq. 2)                                ,   (Eq. 3)








Figure 3. Global detection performance with respect to compression for systems A, B, C, and D. Black triangles and black lines represent derived results from 25fps, and gray stars and gray lines represent derived results from 5fps. In the first column of graphs, the regression lines from equ 3 together with all the detection proportion points are plotted against the natural logarithmic kbps. For the rest of the graphs, the points of the total number of correctly identified attacks (connected with a line) for each type (Yeses, Noes, Variations) are plotted against kbps. 

Table III. Results from the logistic regression for each analytics system. Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1










4.2. Parameter performance analysis with respect to compression  

This section includes diagnostics with a detailed analysis on the performance of each system. Figures 4 to 7 provide the results from the logistic regression analysis for each attack parameter with respect to the natural logarithm of kbps (i.e. compression levels). The first three parameters (close, middles and far) are under the distance group, the next two parameters (perpendicular and diagonal) are under the orientation group and so on (i.e. parameters and groups are provided in table II). In these figures, the plotted proportion points and regression lines supply a visual understanding on how the systems behave for each attack parameter.  The vertical axes represent proportion detection (ranging between 0 and 1) and the horizontal axis the natural logarithm of kbps. The points (black triangles for 25fps and gray stars for 5fps) represent proportions and the lines are the fitted models (black lines for 25fps and gray lines for 5fps). 

Tables IV, V, VI and VII correspond to each of the four systems and provide an objective analysis on the parameters. These tables include results from logistic regression for specific compression levels/frame rates (i.e. this includes five combinations: Reference at 25fps, 1200kbps at 25fps, 200kbps at 25fps, 240kbps at 5fps, and 40kbps at 5fps) and all the attack parameters (family = binomial/quasibinomia, link = “logit”. The command line in R looks like this:   
y225at25fps<-cbing(number.of.successes, number.of.failures)
logisticModel <- glm(y225at25fps ~ Contrast+Distance+Discription+Approach+Orientation, binomial((link = "logit")))

For example, table IV, includes some labels in the parameter column. The label Contrast: low is a combination of the group (Contrast) and parameter (Low). The next column is the score associated with this combination for Sys.A using the reference uncompressed footage at 25fps. For example, if the score is negative than it is a penalty score (less correct detection) and if the score is positive than it is a bonus score (more correct detection). If a level has not a score, it is assumed to be zero[32]. The prediction of an attack with specific parameters is given by adding up the scores of the levels plus the intercept. Extreme score values are caused when a parameter does not consist with a variety of data (successes and failures, not just successes). For example, if the log roll parameter (appears only in three attacks) happens to always been detected correctly. In these situations the optimizer in logistic regression over fits the model and becomes more generous with the scores. 





Figure 4. System A performance. Logistic regression of parameters with respect to compression in logarithmic kbps.  Explain data points and lines. If the same as Fig 3, then mention it.

Table IV. Logistic regression for specific compression levels and frame rates. Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1








Discription:Two people        	0.152	1.000	-23.611	0.999	-0.224	0.877	0.048	1.000	0.1696	0.867
Approach:Crawl 	42.977	0.999	47.324	1.000	-0.722	0.777	38.579	0.998	-14.8692	0.994
Approach:Creep walk         	-25.753	0.999	23.440	1.000	17.656	0.995	58.299	0.996	-12.2308	0.995
Approach:Crouch Run         	-2.499	1.000	-1.124	1.000	-1.884	0.441	-21.968	0.998	-18.9890	0.993
Approach:Crouch Walk        	43.424	0.999	24.669	1.000	-0.838	0.746	59.553	0.996	-15.4580	0.994








Figure 5. System B performance. Logistic regression of parameters with respect to compression in logarithmic kbps. Same as in 4.

Table V. Logistic regression for specific compression levels and frame rates. Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Parameters	Sys.B Ref Coef.	Sys.B Ref  Pr(>|z|)	Sys.B 1200/25 Coef.	Sys.B 1200/25 Pr(>|z|)	Sys.B 200/25 Coef.	Sys.B 200/25 Pr(>|z|)	Sys.B 240/5 Coef.	Sys.B 240/5 Pr(>|z|)	Sys.B 40/5 Coef.	Sys.B 40/5 Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	 -5.382	0.023*	11.733	0.996	15.688	0.996	17.227	0.995 	18.117	0.993  
Contrast:Low	 3.871	0.002**	1.924	0.033* 	 -0.179	0.809	 0.081	0.917	  -0.365	0.597 
Contrast:LowMedium  	 4.951	0.001** 	3.625	0.002** 	1.393	0.077.  	0.169	0.816   	0.284	0.642
Contrast:Medium	 3.744	0.002**	 1.598	0.076.	 0.935	0.201    	-0.782	0.290	0.771	0.234
Contrast:VeryLow	2.772	0.039* 	1.736	0.116	2.726	0.079.	  -0.851	0.409	 -0.485	0.602
Distance:Middle 	3.108	0.005** 	 2.114	0.008** 	0.941	 0.166 	0.480	0.415	0.170	0.718
Distance:Close	 0.268	0.774	 0.823	0.236	-0.454	0.435	-1.322	0.021* 	 -1.397 	0.006**
Discription:Two people        	 -0.311	0.999	 -15.736	0.995	 0.411	 0.999 	0.503	0.999	0.443	0.999
Approach:Crawl 	-0.051	0.958	 0.812	0.223	-0.222	 0.738	 0.383	 0.596	-0.176	0.778  
Approach:Creep walk         	 6.939	0.000***	 22.604 	0.993	21.184	0.994	21.998	0.995	21.809	0.994
Approach:Crouch Run         	5.398	0.000***	7.074	0.000***	 1.639	0.019* 	1.975	0.009**	1.026	0.092.
Approach:Crouch Walk        	 6.02301	0.000***	22.573	0.995	 4.435	0.023* 	5.994	0.008**	21.987	0.995 
Approach:Log Roll            	4.643	0.011*	3.406	0.003**	1.777	0.067.	2.013	0.054.	1.289	0.134 
Approach:Run	  4.361	0.000***	 4.484	0.000***	2.619	 0.000***	1.627	0.021*	0.358	0.522   
Approach:Walk	23.559	 0.994	22.811	0.993	 21.259	 0.994	21.848	0.994	21.599	0.993
Approach: Ladder     	6.743	0.009** 	4.963	0.000***	21.295	0.997	21.565	0.997	3.481	0.003**




Figure 6. System C performance. Logistic regression of each level of the attack parameters (from table II) with respect to compression.  Same as in 4

Table VI. Logistic regression for specific compression levels and frame rates. Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1








Discription:Two people        	0.615	0.999	0.641	0.99990	0.479	0.999	0.640	0.999	0.819	1.000
Approach:Crawl 	2.109	0.406	0.897	0.50808	16.212	0.998	0.721	0.999	0.447	1.000
Approach:Creep walk         	17.760	0.995	0.131	0.91317	15.473	0.998	-16.286	0.997	-18.190	0.998
Approach:Crouch Run         	-3.515	0.010*	-2.697	0.0118 *	-22.094	0.997	-20.773	0.996	-20.680	0.997
Approach:Crouch Walk        	17.760	0.996	18.323	0.997	15.709	0.998	0.309	1.000	-0.703	1.000








Figure 7. System D performance. Logistic regression of parameters with respect to compression in logarithmic kbps. Same as in 4

Table VII. Logistic regression for specific compression levels and frame rates. Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
Parameters	Sys.D Ref Coef.	Sys.D Ref  Pr(>|z|)	Sys.D 1200/25 Coef.	Sys.D 1200/25 Pr(>|z|)	Sys.D 200/25 Coef.	Sys.D 200/25 Pr(>|z|)	Sys.D240/5 Coef.	Sys.D 240/5 Pr(>|z|)	Sys.D 40/5 Coef.	Sys.D40/5 Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept)	42.590	0.997	41.856	0.997	42.290	0.997	42.919	0.996	47.065	0.997
Contrast:Low	0.199	0.845	20.549	0.997	21.465	0.996	-1.022	0.166	-0.293	0.607





Discription:Two people        	0.383	1.000	0.366	1.000	0.393	1.000	0.423	0.999	40.227	0.996
Approach:Crawl 	0.014	1.000	-0.444	1.000	-0.400	1.000	0.312	0.999	37.397	0.998
Approach:Creep walk         	-0.389	1.000	0.328	1.000	0.246	1.000	0.982	0.999	37.389	0.998
Approach:Crouch Run         	-21.180	0.998	-21.829	0.998	-21.549	0.998	-22.035	0.998	-24.012	0.998
Approach:Crouch Walk        	-0.352	1.000	1.078	1.000	0.872	0.999	1.965	0.999	38.149	0.998






Table VIII. Summary of the most influential parameters showing the highest penalty scores for each system at five combinations of footage. 
System Name	Ref/25	1200/25	200/25	240/5	40/5
Sys. A	Perp. Close 	Perp. , Close 	Close, Run	Very low, Crouch run	Crouch run, Run 
Sys. B	Perp., Two people 	Perp., Two people 	Perp., Close 	Perp., Close 	Perp., Close 
Sys. C	Perp., Run	Perp., Run	Crouch run, Run 	Crouch run, Run 	Crouch run, Run 
Sys. D	Crouch run, Run 	Crouch run, Run 	Crouch run, Run 	Crouch run, Run 	Crouch run, Very low

4.3 False alarms 

Table VIII, consists of four sub-tables that correspond to each of the four VA systems. The sub-tables provide information on the system name, the clip number (clip description can be found in table I), amount of compression and number of frame rates (e.g. 2000 at 25fps – 2000/25), and the total summed number of the false alarms occurred from the 10 time repetition trials. For example, system A (Sys. A) has produced 210 false alarms (e.g. average of 21 false alarms 210/10)  with compressed footage at 2000kbps and 25fps for clip 12. “Where Nnone” indicates nil zero production of false alarms. Some compression levels are missing in the sub-tables for systems C and D as no false alarms were produced for these missing compression levels.  





























Results have shown that every system has performed slightly differently for each compression/frame rate level (see the Yeses, Noes and Variation graphs in figure 3), whilst but overall compression has not adversely affected the performance of the systems (see regression graphs lines in figure 3, left column). The results in table IV have shown indicated a significant correlation between proportion detection of attacks and compression for systems A and D only and at only for a frame rate of 5fps. This is also shown in the visually perceptible from the corresponding logistic regression graphs in figure 3. We conclude that the proportion of correct attack detection for systems A and D at 5fps increases significantly with increasing kbps (less compression). For the rest of the compression levels and systems, compression has not affected the overall performance of the systems. This is overall a positive results, since it indicates that footage can be significantly compressed (for storage or transmission purposes) with very little loss in the correct attack identification.

Some systems have performed better (A and D) than others (Band C). For example, in figure 3 the total number of attacks always detected (Yeses graphs) arenumber of attacks always detected (Yeses graphs) is higher for both 25fps and 5fps for the better systems than the rest. Some further observations can be made from the Yeses graphs: a) System A performance has dropped with reduced frame rate and high compression levels (200kbps at 25fps and 40kbps at 5fps), b) System B performance has dropped with the reference footage and a slight increase can be seen at 2000kbps with 25fps. Also, performance has dropped with reduced frame rate and with higher compression at 5fps. c) System C performance seems to be constant throughout the different levels of compression/frame rates and increase of performance can be seen at higher compression levels (200kbps at 25fps) and with reduced frame rate.  D) System D performance has dropped with reduced frame rate and high compression levels at 5fps (40kbps at 5fps). In the Noes graphs, the performance at 25fps and 5fps was similar for systems C and D. For systems A and B, more missed attacks were observed at 5 fps. In the variation graphs, the performance at 25fps and 5fps has been the same for systems A, B and C. Dropped of performance, in terms of total number of attacks causing variations, can be seen for system D at 5fps. 

Most false alarms (table IX) were triggered with the distraction clip 12, which was filmed on a sunny day. Clip 12 contains small clouds in the sky causing many abrupt illumination changes and moving shadows through the fence (table I for clip description). Not many false alarms were produced from the clips containing attacks. 

Figures 4 to 7 provide a quick visual examination on the performance of the systems for the individual parameters. Good performance can be seen visually when most of the points and regression lines are near to maximum detection (value of 1) and reduction of performance can be seen when the points are distributed around the graph and regression lines are not close to maximum detection. The most influential parameters (in terms of reducing the correct detection) at different compression levels and frame rates is provided by tables IV, V, VI and VII. Tables VIII, provides a summary of the top two lowest (negative) scored parameters for each system at the different compression levels and frame rates. Parameter perpendicular includes 98 attacks out of the total 110 attacks under investigation. It is normal that this parameter has been picked up by the logistic regression analysis as the most negatively influential parameter. Parameter very low (contrast group), seems to affect performance more at 5fps than at 25fps.  Most systems seem to have a problem with parameters run, crouch run (approach group) and close (distance group). Perhaps, the developers of such systems do not expect the attacker to be close to the camera and their systems have not been tuned for such occasions. System developers, seeing the analysis included in this work, would be able to understand where their system needs improving.  
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